Had the international community held the Palestinian Authority (PA) accountable for financial and administrative corruption after the signing of the Oslo Accords 30 years ago, the Iran-backed Hamas terrorist group would not have gained popularity among Palestinians.
Although many Palestinians support Hamas's policy of rejecting Israel's right to exist, the Islamist group's victory greatly reflected the desire of the Palestinian public to end corruption in the PA government and institutions.
The most common forms of corruption seem to be the offenses of favoritism, nepotism, embezzlement of public funds, breach of trust, abuse of power, bribery and money laundering.
The best way to undermine Hamas and help the Palestinians is by offering the people a better alternative to the Islamist movement. The current Palestinian Authority leadership is just not seen by many Palestinians as a better alternative to Hamas. That is because the United States, European Union and other donors are not banging on the table and demanding an end to the PA's authoritarian and corrupt conduct.
Had the international community held the Palestinian Authority (PA) accountable for financial and administrative corruption after the signing of the Oslo Accords 30 years ago, the Iran-backed Hamas terrorist group would not have gained popularity among Palestinians. The current PA leadership is just not seen by many Palestinians as a better alternative to Hamas. That is because the US, EU and other donors are not banging on the table and demanding an end to the PA's authoritarian and corrupt conduct.
Hamas became so popular that its representatives won the last elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), in 2006. The Hamas-affiliated Change and Reform list received 44.45% of the vote and won 74 of the 132 seats in the PLC.
Although many Palestinians support Hamas's policy of rejecting Israel's right to exist, the Islamist group's victory greatly reflected the desire of the Palestinian public to end corruption in the PA government and institutions.
Justin Curtis wrote in Harvard University's Exposé Magazine in 2016:
"On the campaign trail, Hamas effectively framed the election as a choice between itself and a corrupt, inefficient, and outdated regime [headed by Yasser Arafat]. The Islamist group made a concerted effort to come across as a progressive alternative to Fatah [the ruling faction headed by Arafat], even changing its name to the 'Change and Reform' party in advance of the election.
Although Hamas's electoral platform referenced Islamic dogma, the party downplayed its more extremist, Islamist rhetoric. A significant portion of Hamas's 2006 platform was spent discussing 'public freedoms' and common-sense 'administrative reform,' hardly the talk of revolutionary radicals.
Pledging a variety of anti-corruption initiatives, Hamas subtly rebuked Fatah's double-dealing and profiteering. In a similar vein, Hamas promised to 'stress transparency and accountability in dealing with public funds,' emphasizing that taxpayer money would go to economic development projects, not to fraudulent bureaucrats. Moreover, Hamas denounced the excessive authority of the federal government, advocating for 'political pluralism and the rotation of power.' Outlining reforms to the judiciary and legislative branches, Hamas sounded less like a terrorist cabal and more like reform-minded technocrats.....
"Exasperated by Fatah's corruption, Palestinians welcomed Hamas's clarion calls for accountability and good governance."
Hamas's rising popularity and its subsequent victory in the parliamentary elections did not surprise many Palestinians. Public opinion polls conducted before the elections showed that 87% of Palestinians believed that corruption exists in PA institutions. The polls, in addition, showed that a majority of Palestinians believed that Hamas was more able to fight corruption (46% for Hamas vs. 37% for Fatah).
The international community chose to turn a blind eye to the corruption of the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of Arafat. Many Western journalists covering Palestinian affairs also failed to report on the runaway corruption in PA institutions. Had the journalists reported on the issue, it is possible that taxpayers in the donor countries would have put pressure on their governments to hold the PA leadership accountable for depriving their people of the international aid. It would have been a move that might well have prevented Hamas from rising to power.
According to British-Palestinian journalist Diana Alghoul:
"The Oslo Accords meant Arafat sat on $4 billion in donations from the US, the European Union and Japan, as well as Israeli sales tax that was passed onto the Palestinian leader.
"While there are estimates that Arafat was worth an average of $3 billion, the real figure of his overall worth remains disputed. Following revelations surrounding the PA's largest corruption scandal, an internal PA audit showed a quarter of the governing's body for 1997 was 'lost' as a result of corruption and mismanagement.
"The bureaucratic nature of the PA meant that little oversight gave way for sharks to ultimately steal from Palestinian public money. After the 1997 audit was released, Arafat had demanded all future PA audits to be kept secret."
Arafat did not want the world to know about the corruption and mismanagement in PA institutions. Yet, it is hard to believe that the Western donors were not aware of the situation.
Some of the donor countries later woke up and realized they had made a mistake by failing to demand an end to corruption in the Palestinian Authority's institutions -- but it was too late. Hamas had already won the parliamentary election. A year later, in 2007, Hamas staged a violent and bloody coup in the Gaza Strip, toppling and expelling the PA, by then headed by Arafat's successor, Mahmoud Abbas. Many Palestinians did not shed a tear over the removal of Abbas's regime from Gaza: they were frustrated with the ongoing corruption of the PA leadership and institutions.
Instead of learning from their past mistakes, the donor countries continued to support the Palestinian Authority under Abbas, despite its failure to comply with demands for major political and economic reforms. True, there is not quite as much corruption in the PA today, but as far as many Palestinians are concerned, the measures Abbas's governments have taken are insufficient.
Meanwhile, Hamas leaders have also shown that they are no less corrupt than Abbas and other PA officials. Many Hamas leaders moved to Qatar, where they have lived comfortable lives and reportedly became millionaires and billionaires.
A poll published in 2022 found that a majority of Palestinians believe that the sectors most susceptible to corruption are the Palestinian Authority government institutions, especially the executive and public sector institutions (ministries, security services, local authorities).
The most common forms of corruption seem to be the offenses of favoritism, nepotism, embezzlement of public funds, breach of trust, abuse of power, bribery and money laundering. Twenty four percent of Palestinians considered favoritism and nepotism as the most common offense, followed by embezzlement of public funds (23%), breach of trust (13%), abuse of power (12%), bribery for delivering a public service (10%) and money laundering (8%).
The destruction of Hamas's military capabilities by Israel should be viewed as a positive development, but it is unlikely to decrease Hamas's popularity among the Palestinians.
The best way to undermine Hamas and help the Palestinians is by offering the people a better alternative to the Islamist movement. The current Palestinian Authority leadership is just not seen by many Palestinians as a better alternative to Hamas. That is because the United States, European Union and other donors are not banging on the table and demanding an end to the PA's authoritarian and corrupt conduct.
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Khaled Abu Toameh is an award-winning journalist based in Jerusalem.
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