Go it alone on defence, stick with America or try to muddle through?
DONALD TRUMP’S return to the White House is a bombshell moment for Europe. The continent’s powers face the erosion, perhaps dissolution, of their principal alliance at the very moment that Russia has the upper hand in the war in Ukraine. They face a stark choice: find an accommodation with the Kremlin or vastly increase spending on defence and security to keep Ukraine solvent and Vladimir Putin at bay. That debate could unite Europe. It is just as likely to split it.
In the months after Mr Trump’s inauguration on January 20th European governments will seek to limit the damage. A cascade of leaders, ministers and officials will try to persuade Mr Trump and his advisers to affirm American commitment to nato, to continue American aid to Ukraine and to ensure that any peace deal does not condemn Ukraine to permanent subordination. Mark Rutte, nato’s secretary-general, will appeal to Mr Trump’s vanity, telling the president-elect that he is single-handedly responsible for European rearmament and that Europeans are vital partners in America’s quest to contain Chinese power.
But European governments know they face steep odds. These discussions are likely to unfold amid a blazing global trade war, including American tariffs on Europe. And even if Mr Trump does not formally walk out of nato, he could hollow out Article 5, its mutual-defence clause, with a few glib remarks.
Mr Trump’s Ukraine policy will be shaped by his choice of advisers. The early signs are that mainstream hawks, like Mike Waltz and Marco Rubio, will have to compete with more radical figures such as Tulsi Gabbard and Pete Hegseth. Mr Trump might advocate a version of the deal proposed by J.D. Vance, his vice-president-elect: freeze the front lines and demand that Ukraine remain neutral. He might ask Europeans to deploy troops.
A second Trump term may persuade Europe that American priorities have changed permanently
How would Europe respond? One option is to try to muddle through. Perhaps Russia will run out of steam in Ukraine. Perhaps Mr Putin will respect the terms of a ceasefire. Perhaps a pro-European president will return to the White House in 2028. Such complacency has long been Europe’s default course of action.
But a second Trump term may persuade European powers that American politics and priorities have changed permanently. Alongside the prospect of a Ukrainian defeat, that could prompt more dramatic action.
The first and most urgent problem is resources: only about two-thirds of NATO’s 30 European members currently spend 2% of GDP on defence. Without America, they would need to spend perhaps twice that to have any hope of filling the resulting military gaps. That would mean piling up debt, raising taxes or slashing health and welfare spending. And it would take years—far longer than Mr Trump’s four years in office—to rebuild defence industries.
Europeans would also need to decide whether to reorganise the basis of their collective defence. At present, Europe’s armed forces have prioritised NATO while also hedging their bets by expanding security and defence capabilities in other institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and regional military blocs such as the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force. Because NATO operates by consensus, Mr Trump could paralyse the alliance in a war, preventing Europeans from implementing its defence plans.
But deprioritising NATO would raise thorny questions. Relying on the EU would risk cutting out Britain, the continent’s largest military spender, as well as Turkey, with one of its largest armies. Mr Trump’s victory is also likely to prompt a renewed debate over the role of British and French nuclear weapons in deterring attacks elsewhere in Europe.
These will be messy, schismatic debates. In northern, central and eastern Europe, particularly among the states of the former Warsaw Pact, governments will fight back against any American efforts to impose a bad deal on Ukraine. Defence spending in the so-called front-line states, already high, will rise further. Yet this hawkish bloc does not, by itself, have the resources or industrial capacity to keep Ukraine supplied, let alone substitute for American military power in Europe. The role of Britain, France and Germany will be crucial.
Britain is joined at the hip with America in intelligence and nuclear matters. It would have the most to lose in a complete break with Mr Trump’s administration. France would be bolder, urging the EU to take more radical steps in common defence, such as issuing joint debt to fund military spending. In Germany the pro-Russian far right has gained ground ahead of federal elections in February, but both the two main parties might regard a second Trump term as a catalysing moment, perhaps the sort of emergency that would even justify deficit spending for defence.
In all three cases, it is unclear how governments would respond to a Trump-led peace proposal. To fight it would mean boosting defence spending to buy, produce and send arms to Ukraine. To acquiesce would be to grant Russia a partial victory, give it time to rebuild its forces and agree to live with a new iron curtain—or under the shadow of another war. ■
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Illustration: Cristiana Couceiro
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